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THE HORNE DILEMMA: PROTECTING PROPERTY’S RICHNESS
AND FRONTIERS
LYNDA L. BUTLER ∗
ABSTRACT
In a 2015 decision, the Supreme Court concluded that real and
personal property should not be treated differently under the
Takings Clause and that a government condition requiring raisin
growers, in certain years, to reserve a percentage of their crop
for the government to manage in noncompetitive venues was a
per se physical taking. The decision to treat both real and
personal property as equally worthy of protection under the
Takings Clause has merit given the weak historical evidence
suggesting stronger protection for land and the importance of
personal property to income generation and capital development
in a modern society. What does not make sense is the Court’s
continued expansion of its per se physical takings concept to
govern many types of property and regulatory settings. Both real
and personal property come in many sizes, shapes, and colors.
Takings analysis should not ignore differences in the types of
property, nor in the complexities of the various property settings.
Under a per se approach, those differences do not matter.
Under a per se approach, the Court’s physical takings analysis is
simplistic and one-dimensional: did the government physically
appropriate, seize, or invade private property without payment of
just compensation? Generally left out of the equation is any
consideration of the public interest or third-party concerns,
regardless of their importance or their role in shaping the
property interest. Nor does a physical appropriation actually
have to occur. The per se physical taking may instead be more
conceptual than actual or may involve one right in a bundle of
rights, still leaving the property owner with other rights. In its
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drive for clarity and simplicity, the Court thus has posed a
serious dilemma for takings jurisprudence: the difficult task of
solidifying constitutional protection for all types of property with
an all-encompassing, absolute rule that can provide sufficient
predictive value for the complex contexts of modern-day property.
What the Court’s approach overlooks is property’s ability to
evolve and provide order for emerging resources and new forms
of property. What the Court’s approach overlooks is the need to
develop constitutional principles that reflect property’s richness
and frontiers.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 2015 decision Horne v. USDA, 1 the Supreme Court made two
significant rulings. The Court first concluded that real and personal
property should not be treated differently under the Takings Clause,2
reasoning that early practices and precedent did not support such a
distinction. 3 Perhaps more significantly, the Court then found the
government requirement that raisin growers, in certain years, reserve a
percentage of their crop for the government to manage in noncompetitive
venues to be a per se physical taking. 4 The Court’s reasoning behind the
1.
2.
3.
4.

135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2425–28.
Id. at 2430–31.
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latter ruling focused on the control that a government entity had over the
regulated raisins and its ability to require the transfer of the raisins. 5 Both
conclusions could have far-reaching implications for constitutionally
protected property and for the countless government programs regulating
property. The rulings also collectively cast serious doubt on the differences
between regulatory and physical takings.
The decision to treat both real and personal property as equally worthy
of protection under the Takings Clause has merit. Both the practices and
the rhetoric of takings cases suggest that personal and real property were
protected under the Takings Clause. The historical evidence suggesting
stronger constitutional protection of land is weak and reflects a bygone era
when land was the main source of wealth. Early practices certainly indicate
that the Court found compensable takings for personal as well as real
property, at least when the property had value. 6 Some of the traditional
rhetoric surrounding the Takings Clause supports a special link between
land and the liberty or autonomy interests of the individual owner,7 but
many types of property now help to promote those interests.
The conclusion that personal property is equally deserving, however,
does not justify ignoring the differences between real and personal property
and between subcategories of property in conducting a takings analysis.
The decision to apply the per se physical takings test to the reserve
requirement does just that. This decision potentially expands the realm of
the per se physical taking to include even some non-trespassory regulatory
settings. Based on Horne, for example, a condition on entry into a
regulated market established to protect price and encourage production
could be converted into a physical taking if the government bars access to
stored goods in enforcing the condition. Ignoring the wide variation among
different types of property overlooks the complexities of context that shape
the development of new property interests. Personal property, in particular,
covers a wide range of resources and interests that are limited only by
human ingenuity and creativity. While real property interests are tied to the
land, personal property may be tangible or intangible, newly discovered or
created, unable to be occupied except conceptually through the law,
perishable or long-lasting, or nonrivalrous despite exclusive rights.
Personal property includes tangible goods, pets and livestock, agricultural
5. Id. at 2428.
6. Early on, for example, owners of unimproved land did not always receive compensation
when their land was condemned by the government. See McClenachan v. Curwen, 6 Binn. 509,
513 (Pa. 1802) (“[B]ut as by the law of 1700, although a compensation is directed to be made for
the improved land of any person, . . . yet as to the woodland or unimproved ground, there is no
compensation to be made . . . .”).
7. See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for
Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOL. L.Q. 227, 246–50 (2004) (evaluating the
Court’s distinction between real and personal property in takings law).
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products, stocks, bank accounts, patents, literary creations, a person’s
identity or image, first-in-time broadcasts, email, software, business
operations, goodwill and stock-in-trade, commercial paper, security
interests, proprietary information, and so on. The differences between the
types of property relate to the nature of the asset subject to the property
interest, to the property uses that have developed in a particular resource,
and to the legal regimes defining and managing the interests.
Under a per se approach, these differences do not matter. Under a per
se approach, the Court’s physical takings analysis is simplistic and onedimensional: did the government physically appropriate, seize, or invade
private property without payment of just compensation? Generally left out
of the equation is any consideration of the public interest or third-party
concerns, regardless of their importance or their role in shaping emerging
property interests. 8 Nor does a physical appropriation actually have to
occur after Horne (where the property owner kept possession of the raisins).
The per se physical taking may instead be more conceptual than actual or
may involve one right in a bundle of rights, still leaving the property owner
with other rights. 9
Providing logically consistent legal principles for new or complex
contexts is assumed to flow from the simplicity of the Court’s per se rule.
In its drive for clarity and simplicity, the Court thus has posed a serious
dilemma for takings jurisprudence: the difficult task of solidifying
constitutional protection for all types of property with an all-encompassing,
absolute rule that can provide sufficient predictive value for the complex
contexts of modern-day property. Yet, instead of clarity, the Court in
Horne creates confusion about the logic of its precedent, about the
transition between physical and regulatory takings, and about the
applicability of a simple, absolute rule to complex forms of property and
regulatory settings. What the Court’s quest for clarity and simplicity misses
is property’s ability to evolve and provide order for emerging resources and
property forms. What it misses is the need to develop constitutional
principles that protect property’s richness and frontiers.
I. THE HORNE DECISION
The regulatory program challenged in Horne was developed under the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. 10 The Act authorized the
8. The Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), defined a
categorical or per se taking as “compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest
advanced in support of the restraint.” Id. at 1016.
9. See Lynda L. Butler, The Governance Function of Constitutional Property, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1687, 1695–1700, 1757–67 (2015) (comparing the crystallization of modern
physical takings analysis with the complexity of traditional physical takings analysis).
10. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. §§ 602–674 (2012).
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Secretary of Agriculture to adopt orders to stabilize markets for particular
agricultural products by promoting an adequate supply for consumers and a
reasonable income for the farmers. 11 One such order established the Raisin
Administrative Committee (“RAC”) to promote stability in the raisin
market by controlling supply and maintaining prices. 12 The means used by
the RAC to achieve this goal was a requirement that, in certain years, raisin
growers set aside a percentage of their crop for the RAC to manage and
control. Described as a “Government entity” by the Horne Court, 13 the
RAC determined the percentage based on current and past market
conditions. 14
Raisin growers typically ship their crop to raisin handlers, who then
physically set aside the raisins to be held in reserve (“reserve raisins”).
After segregating the reserve raisins, the handlers pack and sell the
remaining raisins (“free-tonnage raisins”), paying the growers only for the
free-tonnage raisins. The RAC decides how to dispose of the reserve
raisins after considering market conditions for current and prior years and
has the power to order handlers to transfer the reserve crop.15 Authorized
disposal options include sale in secondary markets not competitive with
free-tonnage raisins (for example, as table grapes for juice or wine
production) or in export outlets, direct sale to federal agencies or identified
foreign governments, charitable donations, releases to growers agreeing to
decrease their production, and by other means. 16 Raisin Administrative
Committee sales to handlers must maximize producer returns and
11. 7 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602; see also Alan B. Morrison, Response, Horne v. Department of
Agriculture, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (June 22, 2015), http://www.gwlr.org/horne-v-dept-ofagriculture/.
12. 7 C.F.R. § 989.26 (2015). Raisins are especially vulnerable to supply fluctuations and to
changing weather.
13. Horne v. USDA, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015). Consisting mainly of growers and
handlers, the Raisin Administrative Committee operates under the Secretary of Agriculture and is
responsible for such duties as acting as an intermediary between the Secretary and any producer,
packer, dehydrator, or bargaining association; investigating compliance; and establishing rules and
procedures. 7 C.F.R. §§ 989.26–989.39 (2015); see also Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Horne v. USDA, 2009
WL 4895362 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2009) (No. 1:08-CV-01549-LJO-SMS) (“The RAC is an entity
created by the Government. Its decision-making body is made up of paid staff, and
representatives from raisin packers, raisin growers under contract to raisin packers, and
independent raisin growers.”). But see 7 C.F.R. § 989.39 (2015) (explaining that RAC members
and alternates are not to be compensated, with the exception of expenses approved by the
committee); id. §§ 989.79–989.80 (describing how expenses are paid by levying assessments
made onto the handlers).
14. 7 C.F.R. § 989.54 (2015) (discussing trade demand and calculation of preliminary,
interim, and final free and reserve percentages by considering such factors as the estimated
tonnage held by producers and handlers, quality and modifications of minimum grade standards,
world raisin supply and demand, and trends in consumer income).
15. Id. § 989.67(a).
16. Id. § 989.67(b); Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2430 (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 32, Horne
v. USDA, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (No. 14-275)).
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disposition of the reserve raisins. 17 Raisin growers retain the right to
receive any net proceeds from the RAC sales after administrative expenses
and subsidies for export handlers are deducted.18
The economic impact of the reserve requirement has varied from year
to year. According to the government, net proceed distributions to
producers occurred in forty-two of the forty-nine years of the program’s
operation. 19 In the years contested by the Hornes, the net proceeds were
less than the cost of producing the crop in one year and were nothing in the
other year. 20 The percentage of reserve raisins for those years amounted to
forty-seven percent in one year and thirty percent in the other.21
The challengers in Horne are both raisin growers and handlers. In
2002, they refused to set aside the required raisins. When the government
sent trucks to their facility to pick up the reserve crop, the Hornes refused
entry. The government then assessed a fine of about $480,000 for the
market value of the missing raisins, as well as a penalty of over $200,000.
The Hornes brought suit, alleging an unconstitutional taking of their
property. 22
The Ninth Circuit ruled for the government, concluding that the
reserve requirement did not constitute a taking of the Hornes’ property. 23
The court rejected the Hornes’ argument that the requirement was a per se
physical taking, explaining that the regulatory restriction was more properly
analyzed under regulatory takings principles. 24 According to the Ninth
Circuit, “the Takings Clause affords less protection to personal than to real
property.” 25 Further, because the Hornes still retained the right to receive
the net proceeds from the sale of the reserve raisins, the requirement did not
totally divest the Hornes of their property interests.26 Looking to the land
use exaction context, the Ninth Circuit then applied standards governing
conditions imposed in the land use permitting process to the reserve

17. 7 C.F.R § 989.67(d)(1).
18. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424; 7 C.F.R. § 989.66(h) (2015).
19. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2439 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Letter from Donald B.
Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor Gen., to Scott S. Harris, Clerk of Court (Apr. 29, 2015)).
20. Id. at 2424 (majority opinion).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2424–25.
23. Horne v. USDA, 750 F.3d 1128, 1144 (9th Cir. 2014).
24. Id. at 1139, 1141.
25. Id. at 1139. Relying on the decision in Lucas, the Ninth Circuit drew a distinction
between real and personal property protections by contrasting the amount of government control
exerted over each. Id. at 1139–40. The court reasoned that because a State traditionally executed
a higher degree of control over commercial dealings and economic concerns, personal property
received fewer protections, and indeed, the possibility of losing all economic use of that personal
property should even be expected. Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1027–28 (1992)).
26. Id. at 1140.
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requirement. 27 Under those standards, the means used—the reserve
requirement—benefitted the Hornes by supporting the regulated market,
thus protecting the price of free-tonnage raisins, and also was proportionally
related to the public interest in market stability. 28 In essence, the Ninth
Circuit viewed the reserve requirement as a fee for voluntarily entering and
benefitting from a regulated market.
The Supreme Court rejected both the analysis and the conclusion of
the Ninth Circuit. Instead of providing less protection for personal
property, the Court decided that personal property was equally worthy of
constitutional protection. Instead of analyzing the reserve requirement
under regulatory takings principles, the Court evaluated the regulatory
restriction under the physical takings concept. Instead of balancing benefits
and losses to raisin growers from the regulatory program in determining
whether a taking existed, the Court simply focused on whether the
government action constituted a physical appropriation of the Hornes’
property. 29
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts first concluded that
personal property should receive the same protection as real property from
direct physical appropriations. As the Chief Justice explained:
Nothing in the text or history of the Takings Clause, or our
precedents, suggests that the rule is any different when it comes
to appropriation of personal property. The Government has a
categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car,
just as when it takes your home. 30
He found support in the historical English law tradition of the Magna Carta,
which protected crops and other provisions from seizure without
compensation. 31 This tradition also was reflected in colonial and early
statehood practices, which similarly compensated property owners when
government seized their supplies. Indeed, military seizures of privately
owned provisions by the English and American armies during the
27. Id. at 1141–42.
28. Id. at 1143. This analysis applied the standards and principles of the regulatory takings
cases dealing with land use exactions, Nollan and Dolan. The Ninth Circuit likened the Hornes’
situation to one involving a use restriction imposed in a land use permitting process. Rather than
forcing a seizure of the Hornes’ crops, the Secretary imposed a condition on their sale—a
condition that only exists once the Hornes voluntarily introduced their crops into the stream of
commerce. The Hornes could have just as easily refused to send their raisins into interstate
commerce, selected different crops, or chosen not to dry their grapes. Id. at 1141–43 (relying on
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994)). The Ninth Circuit relied on three primary similarities to justify its comparison: the
presence of a conditional exaction, the conditional grant of a government benefit in exchange, and
the choice facing the property owner. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1143.
29. Horne v. USDA, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–29 (2015).
30. Id. at 2426.
31. Id.
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Revolutionary War later led to calls for constitutional protection.32 Further,
since the 1800s, the Court’s precedent has protected personal property from
government seizures without payment of just compensation. 33
Chief Justice Roberts thus declined to extend the distinction made by
the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council between real and
personal property in evaluating whether a regulatory taking existed. 34 In
Lucas, the Court stated that the “State’s traditionally high degree of control
over commercial dealings” involving personal property meant that an owner
of personal property should be “aware of the possibility that new regulation
might even render his property economically worthless”—“at least if the
property’s only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for
sale.” 35 The Lucas Court, however, stressed that applying such a limitation
to land was “inconsistent with the historical compact” of the Takings
Clause. 36 The Horne majority refused to extend the different treatment of
real and personal property to the direct physical appropriation setting,
stressing that Lucas was not a physical takings case. 37
In concluding that the reserve requirement clearly constituted a
physical taking, the majority stressed that the requirement involved both the
physical surrender of the raisins and the transfer of title to the RAC. 38
Though the reserve raisins sometimes remained in the possession of the
handlers, the reserve raisins were always segregated from the free-tonnage
raisins and held “for the account” of the government. 39 Further, the RAC
could dispose of the reserve raisins “as it wishe[d].” 40 In the majority’s
view, the reserve requirement thus deprived raisin growers of their “entire
‘bundle’ of property rights . . .—‘the rights to possess, use and dispose of’”
the raisins, “with the exception of the speculative hope” of receiving “some
residual proceeds.” 41

32. Id. In addition to the military seizures, some have theorized that early statehood efforts
to reallocate debt from creditors to debtors led to the eventual adoption of the Takings Clause.
See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 147–49 (1990).
33. See, e.g., James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1882) (declaring that a patent
conferred an exclusive property interest that could not be appropriated by government without just
compensation).
34. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427–28 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992)).
35. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28.
36. Id. at 1028.
37. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427.
38. Id. at 2428.
39. Id.; see also 7 C.F.R. § 989.66 (2015) (stating “reserve tonnage transferred to a handler
by the committee shall be held by him for the account of the committee”).
40. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2428.
41. Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)).
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The Court also rejected government arguments that the takings inquiry
should weigh the economic impact of the regulatory program, balancing the
benefits to the growers of voluntarily participating in the regulated market
against the growers’ loss of control and sometimes net proceeds.42
According to Chief Justice Roberts, a physical takings analysis does not ask
whether economically viable use remains but rather focuses on the physical
appropriation of the property. 43 “[A] contingent interest of indeterminate
value” does not negate the fact that a physical appropriation has occurred, at
least not when “the value of the interest depends on the discretion of the
taker.” 44 In the majority’s view, these arguments “confuse” the per se
physical takings inquiry with regulatory takings analysis.45 While the
existence of an economically viable use could prevent a regulatory
restriction from being a regulatory taking, it would not save even a partial
physical appropriation from being a physical taking. 46 The Court also
refused to treat participation in the regulated raisin market as a reason to
view the reserve requirement as part of a voluntary exchange. As the Court
explained, ordinary, basic uses of property—such as selling an agricultural
product in the market—do not qualify as special government benefits that
can be used as leverage to secure a “waiver of constitutional protection.” 47
The Horne decision raises more questions than it resolves. The Court
declared that personal property is as worthy as real property of protection
from physical takings, yet it left intact—and without explanation—the
different treatment recognized in Lucas for regulatory takings. The Court
further concluded that the reserve requirement constituted a physical taking,
even though simply prohibiting the sale of the reserves would not have been
a physical taking but would have had a worse economic impact on
growers—a prohibition on sale would have deprived the growers of any
proceeds from the reserves, but it would not have required a transfer of
control to the RAC. The Court explained that the Constitution “is
concerned with means as well as ends.” 48 This logic is contrary to the more
complex approach of traditional courts to physical takings. The traditional
analysis “applied a number of factors to measure how close the government
interference was to an actual, direct physical occupation or
appropriation . . . includ[ing] entry, practical ouster, loss or destruction of
use, intent to repeat, and destruction of value.”49
42. Id. at 2428–29.
43. Id. at 2429 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 323 (2002)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2430–31.
48. Id. at 2428.
49. Butler, supra note 9, at 1757.
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The Horne majority also ignored a different approach to physical
takings announced in a 2012 decision, as well as some judicial resistance to
the expansion of rules-based tests. 50 The 2012 decision, Arkansas Game &
Fish Commission v. United States, 51 rejected application of the per se rule
to government-authorized flooding that was temporary and not necessarily
recurring, instead using a “more complex balancing process.” 52 That
process weighed the nature, duration, and foreseeability of the government
invasion with the harm to the landowner, including interference with
reasonable, investment-backed expectations.53 Although the Court in
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission clarified that a physical taking could
arise even when government-induced flooding was temporary, the decision
clearly signals that the per se approach is not the only test for physical
takings. 54 The Court in Horne suggests otherwise, treating the per se
approach as the only test that should be applied to government-mandated
physical transfers of regulated personal property.
Further, by framing the claim against the regulatory restriction as a per
se physical taking, the Horne majority blurs the distinction between
regulatory and physical takings and enables property owners to circumvent
a number of principles that previously made a regulatory takings conclusion
more difficult to reach. The per se physical takings approach, for example,
gets around the “as a whole” standard that the Court adopted to prevent
conceptual severance in a regulatory setting.
In Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 55 the Court declared that it would
evaluate the impact of a regulatory action by examining the property as a
whole and would not treat the regulated interest as a “discrete segment[].”56
Otherwise, property owners could manipulate the interest they claimed to
be taken, narrowing it to just the regulated portion and increasing the
likelihood of a Lucas taking involving a total wipeout of economically

50. See Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 888 (2013)
(proposing that the Nollan and Dolan rules-based expansion has stoked judicial resistance in lower
courts and even subsequent Supreme Court decisions due to the difficulty of “applying any single
or formulistic vision of constitutional property to the complex and variable situations involving
ordinary property”).
51. 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
52. Id. at 521 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
n.12 (1982)).
53. Id. at 522–23.
54. For a discussion of potential problems raised by Arkansas Game & Fish Commission and
a proposed analytical approach distinguishing between the exclusion and governance strategies to
property, see Butler, supra note 9, at 1714–20.
55. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
56. Id. at 130–31. This approach has been reiterated by subsequent decisions. See, e.g.,
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326–27 (2002)
(rejecting the temporal severance argument and concluding that a building moratorium did not
cause a total economic loss for the period when the moratorium applied).
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viable use. 57 If, instead, physical takings analysis is applied to a regulation
involving the transfer of a part, the “as a whole” perspective does not
matter. As the Horne Court explains, even a permanent physical
appropriation of just a few inches of land is considered a per se physical
taking. 58 Under this analysis, when the property is a fungible product like
raisins, a government requirement to physically reserve and transfer just a
small amount of raisins—say 1%—would be a physical taking. The fact
that the raisin grower still had 99% of her crop would not be considered.
Under the Court’s analysis, the amount of free-tonnage raisins simply
would not matter.
The physical takings approach of the Horne decision also allows the
Court to ignore the context surrounding the reserve requirement, including
the fairness dimension of regulatory takings analysis addressed through
such concepts as average reciprocity of advantage and evening out of the
benefits and burdens of regulatory life. 59 When a permanent physical
appropriation exists, the per se approach focuses entirely on the owner. The
benefits to the owner of being in a protected market are irrelevant to
determining whether a physical taking exists. The windfalls received, for
example, from being in a stable market with price controls would not be
part of the physical takings analysis, not even if the price for the ninety-nine
percent of the remaining crop were much higher than if the market were not
regulated. Protection of certain agricultural markets may require some sort
of collective action to overcome the free-rider and transaction cost problems
of an unconstrained, free-for-all market. In these situations, the race to get
to market would simply be too great to ensure the protection of farmers’
income, the sufficiency and safety of the supply, and an adequate number of
long-term players. The benefit to the raisin growers then is not simply the
higher price but also the collective action that overcomes market failure
problems.
Finally, the Court’s application of the per se approach to the reserve
requirement ignores the complexity and breadth of property. Comparing
the seizure of your car to the occupation of your home is too simplistic a
57. In Lucas, the Court declared a law causing a total loss of economically viable use to be a
per se regulatory taking. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–17 (1992).
58. 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2015) (discussing the conclusion in Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430, 436,
that the installation of a small cable box was a physical taking despite the continued economic
viability of the property); see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436–38 (stating that traditional rules are in
place to avoid line-drawing: “constitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be
made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied,” but upon “whether there is a taking
in the first instance”).
59. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes noted how a law’s “average
reciprocity of advantage” had been “recognized as a justification” for the law. 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922). In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, Justice Brennan contrasted a
physical invasion with “interference aris[ing] from some public program adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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justification for the Court’s adoption of a one-dimensional test. 60 This
superficially persuasive—but misleading—1:1 comparison overlooks the
wide variety of assets falling outside of the real property category, as well
as the constant development of new forms of personal property. By
classifying the reserve requirement as a per se physical taking, the Court in
effect defines the property interest as each individual raisin, despite the
requirement’s role in maintaining the value of the crop as a whole. A tract
of land, however, is fixed in its size; the quantity of acreage is known. If a
landowner proposes to subdivide the tract into forty lots but is only allowed
to develop twenty, the landowner still owns the same amount of land. He
has not lost his tract or even a part of it. Agricultural crops produced for
sale, in contrast, are not fixed in number. The yield varies from year to
year, just as the amount of subdivided lots varies depending on the
circumstances. The grower cannot fix the quantity of crops grown ex ante,
making regulatory intervention necessary if a market failure exists. This
difference in the variability of the quantity should affect how a property
interest and a physical taking are defined.
Because the Horne majority applied the per se test to that part of the
raisin crop set aside to maintain the market value of the remaining crop, any
law requiring the physical separation and possible transfer of personal
property would seem to be a per se physical taking. What if a law
mandated the surrender of a firearm by its owner even though the owner
was not prohibited from possessing the weapon? In 2014, California
enacted a law authorizing such action when a judicial officer finds
reasonable or sufficient cause to believe that the owner poses an immediate
and present danger of injury. 61 Or what if a law authorized local
governments to seize the personal property of homeless people when the
property was found in public places? 62 Under the Horne Court’s analysis,
60. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2426.
61. 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5639–43 (West) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524). This law
was amended in 2015 to add protections for the rights of gun owners against unfair seizures. 2015
Cal. Legis. Serv. 1653–55 (West).
62. See A Dream Denied: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, NAT’L COAL.
FOR THE HOMELESS, http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/constitutional.html
(last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (discussing criminalization measures against the homeless and their
constitutional implications); Gale Holland, L.A. City Council OKs Crackdowns on Homeless
Encampments, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-mehomeless-sweeps-20150624-story.html (discussing crackdowns on homeless encampments); Ilya
Somin, The Takings Clause and Government Destruction of Homeless Persons’ Property,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 6, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/09/06/the-takings-clause-andgovernment-destruction-of-homeless-persons-property/ (discussing the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment implications of government seizure of homeless persons’ property); see, e.g., Lavan
v. City of L.A., 693 F.3d 1022, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding the rule that government must
give a property owner notice and a chance to challenge a taking “regardless of whether the
property in question is an Escalade or an EDAR, a Cadillac or a cart”); Pottinger v. City of Miami,
810 F. Supp. 1551, 1570 n.30 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding city’s seizure and destruction of homeless
persons’ personal property to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment). But see Sanchez v. City of
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the possibility of a seizure or transfer of possession would trigger the per se
physical takings test. The context of the law and the public interests
justifying the seizure or transfer could not be considered. Though the
Horne Court hoped to provide a clearer and more predictable takings test, it
instead expanded the application of a test that is divorced from any
consideration of context. Not only can the test not handle the many forms
of personal property, whether tangible or not, it also cannot handle the
complicated legal regimes that accompany and support these property
interests. The Horne decision thus poses a serious dilemma for takings
jurisprudence.
Should the differences between the types of property matter under
takings analysis? Which takings tests or principles best capture the breadth
and variability of property interests while minimizing problems of
inconsistency and unpredictability? These questions will now be addressed.
II. THE PROPERTY PERSPECTIVE
In deciding whether differences between real and personal property
matter for purposes of defining constitutionally protected property, it is
important to focus on the nature of the differences under property law and
then to ask whether these distinctions should have constitutional
implications. Are there reasons flowing from the differences that justify or
necessitate a more nuanced or context-dependent approach under the
Takings Clause? Should a takings test reflect the nature of real and
personal property and the possibility of emerging property forms? Should,
in other words, a takings test reflect the reach and promise of property—its
richness and frontiers?
A. Property’s Breadth and Variability
Personal property comes in many different sizes, shapes, and forms.
In contrast to land, personal property has a broad reach and potential for
evolution. While real property interests are, by definition, tied to
permanent, renewable tracts of land having demarcated boundaries,
personal property may be tangible or intangible, is typically nonrenewable,
and, in the case of many agricultural products, is perishable. Some forms of
personal property are intangible and more conceptual than actual, with the
boundaries of delineation mainly set through a regulatory regime. The
regime and property interests persist because the value of the property far
outweighs the cost of enforcing these murky conceptual boundaries,

Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1104 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (holding a homeless plaintiff had no federal
takings claim when he failed to avail himself of any state procedures for compensation).
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justifying the enforcement efforts. 63 Other types of personal property are
tangible but fungible—like raisins, making it impossible to identify
individual units. Only physical separation can provide a way to distinguish
different batches. Personal property that is tangible, fungible, and
perishable tends to derive its economic value from sale. Large quantities
would only be produced for the market. The greater the sameness, fragility,
or intangibility, the more the need for management and regulations to draw
legal boundaries, resolve conflicts, and protect public interests.
The common law of property traditionally has treated personal
property differently than real property, varying principles, policies, and
rules to reflect the nature of the personal property being acquired, used, or
disputed. As a general matter, possession-based rules have been more
important to personal property as ways to acquire and enforce ownership
rights. 64 The title system similarly is less extensive for personal property
than for real property. Personal property often lacks the durability of land
to justify the costs of establishing a formal title system involving
registration or recordation of title documents. For many types of personal
property, possession is the common law’s preferable source of evidence of
ownership. 65 Some more expensive, durable forms—like cars, boats, art,
and jewelry—have more formal title systems, but they generally are the
exception. 66 For fungible personal property (especially if perishable),
commercial transactions require use of either an inconvenient system based
on total physical separation or a more complex system providing for the
commingling of goods through commercial laws governing warehouse
arrangements and transfers of documents of title. 67
63. Intellectual property interests, for example, may be so valuable that the costs of
enforcement are worth the effort. The Google Books litigation demonstrates how extensive those
efforts can be. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(concluding that the settlement agreement still goes too far in giving Google significant rights to
control copyrighted works without permission), vacated 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013); see also
Jonathan Stempel, Google Defeats Authors in U.S. Book-Scanning Lawsuit, REUTERS (Nov. 14,
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/14/us-google-books-idUSBRE9AD0TT 20131114
(discussing the Google litigation).
64. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY § 16.2 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing the rule
of capture for acquiring ownership of wild animals); id. § 16.3 (discussing first possession as a
requirement of finder’s law, protecting a first possessor over subsequent possessors and third
parties, with the exception of the true owner); id. (unless embedded in state, federal, or Indian
lands, a shipwreck is governed by the law of finds, awarding the finder ownership of the ship and
its contents, or, if the ship has not been abandoned, by the law of salvage, which entitles the finder
to possession and a reward for salvaged goods, but not title).
65. See, e.g., id. § 2.1 (discussing how a presumption of ownership arises from possession of
property and exercise of physical control due to the expense and difficulty of proving true
ownership).
66. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
901–18 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing various title systems for real and personal property).
67. Article 7 of the U.C.C. governs management of goods for storage and transit, recognizing
the use of documents of title by warehousemen and financial institutions in the business of storing
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Recording or registration systems designed to give notice to third
parties and to establish the priority of various rights-holders are also more
extensive for real property than for personal property. Some types of
personal property that are exchanged in the marketplace and financed by
lending institutions have registration systems for title and secured financial
interests. 68 For many forms of personal property, though, no formal system
exists.
Enforcement of property rights also differs depending on whether the
property is real or personal. Trespass to land, for example, is traditionally
handled harshly and swiftly, 69 while trespass to chattel is harder to
establish. 70 Legal regimes for both real and personal property tend to
become more complex if the asset is highly valued, durable, or able to
generate financial capital. Laws regulating oil and gas, for example, began
simply, borrowing the rule of capture used for wild animals. Eventually,
when the rule of capture promoted a race to drill and capture regardless of
demand or ability to store for the future, the laws for oil and gas became
much more complicated.71 Now these laws even allow forced pooling to
gain access to oil and gas on a landowner’s property against her
objections. 72
and handling goods for hire, and delivery of goods. U.C.C. §§ 7-101–7-704 (AM. LAW INST. &
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014). These documents of title
include any record “that in the regular course of business or financing is treated as adequately
evidencing that the person in possession or control of the record is entitled to receive, control,
hold, and dispose of the record and the goods the record covers.” U.C.C. § 1-201(16) (AM. LAW
INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014).
68. Automobiles, for example, have a registration or title system run by the states and are
often subject to the interests of secured creditors governed by Article 9 of the U.C.C. See
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 66, at 913–14 (discussing the interaction of the state’s automobile
title systems with the U.C.C).
69. E.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 166 (Wis. 1997) (upholding
$100,000 in punitive damages for an intentional trespass to land); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 63 (4th ed. 1971) (describing the law of intentional trespass to
land as “exceptionally simple and exceptionally rigorous” (quoting 1 THOMAS ATKINS STREET,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 19 (1906))).
70. Trespass to chattel generally requires proof of harm to the owner. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Common law differences between
trespass and nuisance also suggest that the Horne Court overreached in finding a direct physical
invasion—a trespass-like situation. Under the common law, trespass generally involves an
intrusion onto land by a tangible object “solid and large enough to physically displace” the
landowner. Common law courts have tended to treat invasions by small substances (like gas,
sound, and light waves) as nuisances, not trespasses. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 66, at 29.
71. Under the rule of capture, a landowner may drill for oil and gas on his own land and
eventually may take oil and gas from the same pool extending under neighboring lands. See
generally NANCY SAINT-PAUL, 1 SUMMERS OIL AND GAS, OWNERS RIGHTS TO TAKE OIL AND
GAS § 3:2 (2010), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015). He would have no liability to
compensate the adjoining landowner; thus, a landowner has the incentive to drill first and reap the
benefits of oil and gas that may originate in adjoining lands. Id.
72. See, e.g., Laura Legere, Forced Pooling Policies Remain Unclear in Pennsylvania’s
Shale Plays, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 6, 2015), http://powersource.post-
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One important difference between real and personal property is
personal property’s greater breadth and ability to evolve into new forms,
assets, and interests as technological advances occur. The right to broadcast
over the airwaves, for example, began informally as customs, practices, and
norms developed among broadcasters. When conflicts eventually occurred,
courts recognized a property interest of sorts under the common law to
protect the first-in-time broadcaster from interference by another
broadcaster trying to free-ride on the first user’s signal and reputation.73
Eventually Congress enacted a more complex regulatory regime governing
allocation of broadcast rights over the airwaves.74 Even now, technological
advances continue to lead to new forms of electronic transmissions that
push the boundaries of our thinking about property rights. 75
Intellectual property more broadly has experienced tremendous change
over the years because of emerging technologies. Intellectual property
scholars continue to debate the choice of legal regime, weighing the
reliance on use restrictions traditionally favored by the FCC with the
alternative of recognizing well defined property rights. 76 In addition to the
electromagnetic spectrum, new forms of property are emerging in the
Internet and the electric power grid. 77 These new forms differ in significant
ways from real property, displaying both significant interdependencies and
unpredictable geographic discontinuities or sources of disturbances.78 One
scholar, Christopher Yoo, argues that property theory should focus on these
gazette.com/powersource/policy-powersource/2015/01/06/Forced-pooling-policies-remainunclear-in-Pennsylvania-s-shale-plays/stories/201412300017 (discussing the forced pooling
provisions of a 1961 oil and gas law in the context of hydraulic fracking).
73. E.g., Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station, Inc. (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1926), reprinted in 68
CONG. REC. 215 (1926).
74. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (authorizing the creation of the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) with the purpose of “regulating interstate and
foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio”); 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (establishing
minimum standards to reduce interference with radio reception); 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2012)
(establishing a regime under which broadcast stations apply to receive a license from the FCC).
75. The debate over net neutrality, for example, raises fundamental questions about how to
approach the Internet—as a commons open generally to all or as a resource to be invested in and
developed as private property. See James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a Semicommons, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 2799, 2815–42 (2010) (using economic theory to argue that the Internet should
be treated as a semicommons). The recent battle between cable companies and streaming services
highlights what is at stake. See generally Adam B. VanWagner, Seeking a Clearer Picture:
Assessing the Appropriate Regulatory Framework for Broadband Video Distribution, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 2909 (2011); Stephen Battaglio, Cable Companies Are Scrambling as More
(May
7,
2015),
Viewers
Become
Cord-Cutters,
L.A.
TIMES
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-cable-companies-cord-cutters20150507-story.html.
76. See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Coase: Emerging Technologies and Property Theory,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 2189 (2012) (explaining the debate from its inception with Ronald Coase to its
potential future implications for policy and property theory).
77. Id. (discussing the implications of these new forms for property theory).
78. Id. at 2204–07.
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differences to govern the new forms of property instead of focusing on the
normal “bargaining-related transaction costs.” 79 Under his approach,
technological interdependencies would be “the key determinant of property
boundaries.” 80 Yoo offers “several lessons for property theory” that
underscore the evolving nature of property’s frontier.81
B. Property’s Management Systems
If the nature of property matters, a regulation requiring physical
separation of reserve raisins from free-tonnage raisins should not, in
isolation, lead to a physical takings finding—at least not when the property
is fungible, perishable, and deriving much of its value from the prospect of
sale in a regulated market. What else might justify the classification of a
reserve requirement like the one in Horne as a per se physical taking? In
addition to physical separation, the Horne majority focused on the transfer
of title, concluding, without much explanation, that “[t]itle to the raisins
passes to the Raisin Committee.” 82 Chief Justice Roberts noted that reserve
raisins may, at times, remain on the premises of the handlers, but even then
the raisins are held ‘“for the account’ of the Government,” which may
dispose of the reserves “as it wishes.” 83 In the majority’s view, the raisin
growers lose all of their property rights in the reserve raisins.84 The
growers’ interest in net proceeds is at best a “speculative hope.” 85
The Court’s analysis unnecessarily limits the nature of the property
arrangement managed and supported by the regulatory regime. Instead of
viewing the situation as a transfer of all legal and equitable interests to the
RAC, the Court could have viewed the arrangement as a transfer of legal
title to the RAC for the purpose of managing the supply of reserve raisins,
leaving the equitable interests with the raisin growers, much like a
beneficiary under a trust. Custody or possession of the reserve raisins
generally would remain with the handlers until directed by the RAC to
dispose of the raisins. Or the Court could have viewed the transfer as a
bailment, much as warehouse arrangements initially are viewed under
commercial law until a transfer of title occurs.86 The equitable or residual

79. Id. at 2204.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Horne v. USDA, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015).
83. Id. at 2428 (quoting 7 C.F.R. § 989.66(a) (2015) on the RAC’s general guidelines on
reserve tonnage).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See UNIF. LAW COMM’N, UCC Article 7, Documents of Title (2003) Summary,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%207,%20Documents%20
of%20Title%20(2003) (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (discussing changes to Article 7 of the Uniform
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interest in the grower would include the right to receive proceeds after
authorized and legitimate deductions are taken. 87 Whether the deductions
are valid is a separate question. Though recovery of administrative
expenses seems reasonable, the subsidies for export handlers are harder to
justify without probing the subsidies’ relation to the disposal of reserve
raisins. The amount of the net proceeds is uncertain, but the regulatory
scheme clearly leaves the interest in the proceeds with the growers.
Thus, the Court’s characterization of the transfer is important. The
transfer of all interests is very different from the transfer of legal title for
management purposes. The RAC needs enough power to manage the
reserves and achieve its regulatory purpose of stabilizing the raisin market.
Achieving this goal not only involves controlling the supply but also
overcoming the strategic behavior of growers in an unrestrained market.
Any discretion that the RAC has over the reserve raisins should be limited
by its regulatory purpose, just as a trustee is limited by the terms of the trust
and relevant trust law.88 The discretion of the RAC is not unlimited, as the
Court suggests; both statutory and regulatory law provide constraints to
guide oversight. Though the RAC has significant gatekeeping powers, they
are not equivalent to the entire range of an owner’s powers.
Should the differences in the nature of the property and its
management system matter for purposes of defining constitutionally
protected property? Unless the text or the history of the Takings Clause
suggest otherwise, both real and personal property are equally deserving of
protection. That does not mean, however, that takings jurisprudence should
ignore the nature of the property interest allegedly taken or its management
system and supporting infrastructure. Any approach to constitutionally
protected property that is one-dimensional would fail to anticipate
property’s richness and frontiers. The Court’s opinion in Horne does just
that by applying a test developed for direct physical seizures of tangible
property that is ex ante quantifiable and not dependent for its value on a
regulated market. Property’s forms and management systems are much
more complicated and variable.
Because the history and rhetoric of the Takings Clauses are relevant to
how different types of property are treated, constitutional protection of
property will now be placed within a historical context. This discussion
will show that the historical compact relied on by the Horne Court is not as
clear or certain as the Court suggested.

Commercial Code, which relies on the common law concept of bailments enhanced by the use of
warehouse receipts or documents of title to allow transfers in the marketplace).
87. The regulations authorize deductions for administrative expenses and subsidies to export
handlers. 7 C.F.R. § 989.66(h) (2015).
88. For a discussion of limitations on the decisions of trustees, see GEORGE GLEASON
BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 551 (2014).
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III. THE RHETORIC AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE TAKINGS
CLAUSE
Proposed as part of the Bill of Rights amending the Constitution of
1787, the Takings Clause was ratified without much debate or fanfare.
Other than the reporting of various versions of the Clause and of brief
debates on the danger of majoritarian exploitation, little direct evidence of
the Clause’s ratification process exists. 89 Although secondary sources of
the time, like newspapers and pamphlets, published debates on the need for
constitutional protection of property, those sources generally do not reveal
information about the ratification process and typically provide only the
author’s views of property rights and the need for a just compensation
provision. 90
Because the historical records of the proceedings on the ratification of
the Takings Clause are nominal, scholars have looked to political debates
and institutional practices to develop theories of the meaning and purpose
of the Clause. Some have tended to focus on the rhetoric surrounding
property rights, examining political debates over property rights occurring
during the colonial, revolutionary, and early republican periods. 91 Others
have chosen instead to study the institution of property, paying particular
attention to the laws affecting property rights, as well as actual practices. 92
89. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 402–04 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (discussing the fear of
exploitation); 2 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 361–83 (Neil H. Cogan, ed. 1997) (setting forth
Madison’s proposed bill and the status of the congressional version eventually adopted). For a
good discussion of why the Takings Clause poses “a special problem for the historian of original
intent,” see Harry N. Scheiber, The “Takings” Clause and the Fifth Amendment: Original Intent
and Significance in American Legal Development, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS 233–49 (Eugene W.
Hickok, Jr., ed. 1991).
90. See, e.g., Luther Martin, Genuine Information, No. 8, Jan. 22, 1788, reprinted in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89, at 376; The Federal Farmer, No. 6, Dec. 25, 1787,
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note, 89 at 375.
91. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967) (analyzing similarities in argument, language, and invocation of Revolutionary figures in
Revolutionary-era pamphlets); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990)
(explaining the significance of property in the American political system by examining the
Federalist victory at the Constitutional Convention of 1787); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN
TRADITION 506–07 (1975) (describing Revolutionary literary themes of “a civic and patriot ideal
in which the personality was founded in property, perfected in citizenship but perpetually
threatened by corruption”); David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting
Depictions of Property in the American Political Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 467–69,
477–81 (1993) (“on the rhetorical level property rights were described in ‘absolutist’ terms”).
92. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 1–
30 (1977) (describing the emergence of an instrumental conception of law); Morton J. Horwitz,
The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275,
286 (1973); Schultz, supra note 91, at 481–83 (explaining the Revolutionary trend of thinking of
property “as an institution and not simply a concept”).
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The approach taken—rhetorical or institutional—can affect the meaning
and reach of the Clause. Scholars taking the rhetorical approach, for
example, tend to describe property rights in absolutist terms, relying on the
forceful statements of Locke, Blackstone, Madison, and others who viewed
property rights as fundamentally important. 93 Scholars following an
institutional approach, in contrast, tend to look at how property actually was
treated during America’s formative era to conclude that property rights
were not absolute, but rather subject to economic regulation and other laws
adopted to promote the public good.94
A. The Rhetorical and Institutional Perspectives
The differences between the rhetorical and institutional perspectives
on property developed early in the settlement of America. During the
colonial period, the rhetoric of property was very Lockean. Legal and
political leaders often described property as fundamental to liberty and as
arising from natural law. 95 The laws, regulations, and actual practices in
effect at the time, however, suggest that colonists generally accepted the
notion that government could limit property rights. 96 Indeed, soon after
America was settled, colonial governments began to regulate land use. 97
Colonists apparently understood that the regulation of property was
necessary to promote economic development and achieve other important
social goals. 98 Despite the strong rhetoric of property, colonists became
accustomed to holding property rights subject to the public good. 99 As one
commentator observed, “British common law, colonial and early American
regulatory policies, and case law all sustained significant limits on property

93. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 42–50 (3d ed. 2008)
POCOCK, supra note 91, at 506–07; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 214–19 (1969); Schultz, supra note 91, at 466, 481.
94. See Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 859–93 (1978); Stanley N. Katz,
Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV.
1, 8–9, 14–29 (1977); Schultz, supra note 91, at 486–90.
95. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 120
(University of Chicago Press 1979) (“the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and
regulate these absolute rights of individuals”); ELY, supra note 91, at 28–29 (“colonial leaders
viewed the security of property as the principal function of government”); JOHN LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 87 (Oxford: Fletcher & Sons Ltd. 1976) (“[m]an being
born . . . hath by nature a power . . . to preserve his property—that is, his life, liberty, and estate”);
Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 735, 754–55 (1985)
(describing Locke’s model of property as appealing to American colonists and as “clearly
influenc[ing] the drafting of our American constitution”); Schultz, supra note 91, at 473.
96. See Schultz, supra note 91, at 488.
97. See FRED BOSSELMAN, DAVID CALLIES, & JOHN BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 82 (1973)
(providing an overview of land use regulation in the colonies beginning in 1631).
98. Schultz, supra note 91, at 488.
99. Id. at 489–90.
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rights that contrasted dramatically with the political rhetoric of property
during this era.” 100 This apparent conflict between rhetoric and practice
complicates the task of defining the meaning and scope of the Takings
Clause.
Land use regulation in colonial America applied to a wide range of
purposes and uses. 101 In addition to regulation of agricultural uses, 102
colonial governments regulated noxious land uses, 103 enclosure of lands, 104
mining, 105 uses of waterfront land, 106 drainage of wetlands, 107 and the
location of bakeries, slaughterhouses, stills, and other business
operations. 108 Colonial laws also regulated fishing, fowling, and hunting,
sometimes even preserving public rights to pursue those uses on privately
owned lands. 109 Further, in urban areas, colonial laws often engaged in
community planning by adopting public safety regulations, 110 regulating
aesthetics and location of uses,111 imposing clean up obligations on urban
landowners, 112 and encouraging the development of land. 113
Land distribution laws enacted during the colonial period also imposed
conditions and restrictions on interests acquired under those laws. To
encourage settlement and development, the laws typically imposed clearing,
seating, and planting requirements on parties seeking a land patent. 114
Basically, the parties had to clear the land and build a house or otherwise
affirmatively use the land before they acquired a land patent.115 If a party
failed to fulfill all the conditions for securing a patent, the party lost

100. Id. at 490.
101. See generally John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1252–300 (1996).
102. See ELY, supra note 93, at 18 (describing regulation of both undeveloped and urban
land); Hart, supra note 101, at 1259–65 (detailing colonial practice of imposing affirmative land
use requirements); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 789 (1995) (providing an overview of colonial
land use regulations).
103. See ELY, supra note 93, at 18.
104. Hart, supra note 101, at 1263–65.
105. Id. at 1265–66.
106. Id. at 1266–67.
107. Id. at 1268–72.
108. Treanor, supra note 102, at 789.
109. LYNDA LEE BUTLER & MARGIT LIVINGSTON, VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COASTAL LAW 225–
29 (1988); Hart, supra note 101, at 1272.
110. ELY, supra note 93, at 18.
111. Hart, supra note 101, at 1273–75 (use restrictions), 1275–76 (aesthetic regulations).
112. ELY, supra note 93, at 18; Hart, supra note 101, at 1280–81.
113. Hart, supra note 101, at 1276–79.
114. See, e.g., BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 109, § 8.2.
115. Id.; Hart, supra note 101, at 1259.
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whatever interest had been acquired during the patenting process. 116
Further, if the party failed to meet conditions imposed after the patent was
issued, the party might forfeit the title.117
During the colonial era, governments often used the power of eminent
domain to acquire land for buildings and roads.118 The colony of
Massachusetts, for example, authorized towns to condemn land for
highways, 119 South Carolina allowed the appropriation of land for the
construction of buildings and roads, 120 and Maryland permitted land to be
taken for the construction of tobacco inspection warehouses. 121 Rhode
Island authorized the appropriation of private property to construct a pest
house, 122 and Virginia allowed iron factories to cut and take timber from the
land of adjacent property owners.123 In many colonies, laws authorized
private parties to appropriate land for the construction of watermills.124
Whether just compensation was awarded when property was taken for
public purposes is the subject of much debate. Some scholars, like
Professor James Ely, have argued that the just compensation principle was
well established in England at the time of the colonization of America and
that colonial governments generally recognized this principle.125 As
support, Ely points to a number of colonial governments that required
116. See BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 109, § 8.5, at 283–87 (discussing the nature of
the interest acquired before a patent was issued).
117. Hart, supra note 101, at 1260–63.
118. See BOSSELMAN, CALLIES, & BANTA, supra note 97, at 92–93 (describing generally the
colonial precursors to the eminent domain clause); ELY, supra note 93, at 24 (discussing the
colonial practice of eminent domain).
119. The General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony, 1672, reprinted in 2 THE
LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1641–1691, at 290 (Scholarly Resources, Inc. 1976).
120. The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA 48 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1836).
121. LAWS OF MARYLAND AT LARGE, WITH PROPER INDEXES ch. 18, § 36 (Thomas Brown
ed., 1765); see also James W. Ely, Jr., “That Due Satisfaction May Be Made:” The Fifth
Amendment and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 6 (1992).
122. See Ely, supra note 121, at 5.
123. An Act for Encouraging Adventures in Iron-Works, ch. XLVI, 1748 Va. Laws., reprinted
in 6 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, ch. XLVI (William Waller Hening ed.,
1819) (encouraging adventurers in ironworks); see also An Act for Encouraging Adventures in
Iron-Works, ch. XII, 1727 Va. Laws., reprinted in 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN
THE YEAR 1619, ch. XII (William Waller Hening ed., 1820) (encouraging ironworks by allowing
land to be taken for roads and bridges).
124. See HORWITZ, supra note 92, at 34–35, 260–61 (describing colonial water rights and
eminent domain for the purpose of constructing water mills); John F. Hart, The Maryland Mill
Act, 1669–1766: Economic Policy and the Confiscatory Redistribution of Private Property, 39
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1–2 (1995) (discussing how the Maryland Mill Act “provides a powerful
counterexample to the thesis that colonial American legislatures conscientiously respected
property rights”).
125. ELY, supra note 93, at 23–25; Ely, supra note 121, at 4–13.
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payment of compensation for the construction of highways or buildings. 126
Ely concedes that the colonies were not consistent in actually paying
compensation but notes that compensation would not need to be paid until
improvements were made, and often improvements did not occur.127 He
also notes that the abundance and cheapness of land made payment of
compensation for unimproved land less important; undeveloped land
usually had insignificant monetary value and was always available.128
Professor William Michael Treanor, on the other hand, maintains that
the compensation principle was not generally accepted during the colonial
era. 129 He explains that republican theory controlled thinking about
property rights at this time. Under republican theory, property rights were
held subject to the public good. 130 According to Treanor, the most common
type of taking for the public good occurred when land was appropriated for
the construction of public roads. Yet, “[e]xcept for Massachusetts, no
colony appears to have paid compensation when it built a state-owned road
across unimproved land.” 131 Further, uncompensated takings of personal
property seemed fairly common. Virginia, for example, protected its
reputation as a tobacco producer by authorizing the uncompensated seizure
of tobacco of inferior quality. 132 A provision in Massachusetts’s 1641 Body
of Liberties, in contrast, provided for compensation but only for the seizure
of personal property. 133
Treanor concedes, though, that colonial
governments provided compensation when enclosed or improved land was
taken. 134
Morton Horwitz, in The Transformation of American Law, agrees with
Treanor that the compensation principle “was not widely established in
America at the time of the Revolution.”135 He notes that only colonial
Massachusetts consistently provided compensation for road construction.136
Other colonies either limited the compensation to land that was already
improved or enclosed or did not regularly provide compensation.137 Indeed,
the courts in a few colonies denied compensation for road construction until

126. Ely, supra note 121, at 4–12.
127. Id. at 7.
128. ELY, supra note 93, at 24; Ely, supra note 121, at 11.
129. Treanor, supra note 102, at 785–91.
130. See William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L. J. 694, 695 (1985).
131. Id. at 695 (footnote omitted).
132. Treanor, supra note 102, at 787–88.
133. Id. at 785.
134. Treanor, supra note 130, at 695.
135. HORWITZ, supra note 92, at 63.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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the nineteenth century, reasoning that original land grants expressly
reserved land for building public roads.138
B. The Movement for Reform
The revolutionary period saw increased government infringement of
property rights and greater redistribution of wealth. Common practices
included the seizure of loyalists’ property, the appropriation of debts owed
to British merchants, and the imposition of size limitations on the sale of
seized land. 139 Many creditors fell victim to the use of depreciated paper
money printed to aid debtors.140 Eventually, as the assault on property
became more intense, provisions protecting property rights were
incorporated into national laws and state constitutions. The first national
law requiring compensation for property taken for public use was the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 141 Responding to fears that a territorial
legislature would rescind earlier land grants, the ordinance provided for full
compensation of property taken for public purposes. It declared:
[N]o man shall be deprived of his liberty or property but by the
judgment of his Peers, or the law of the land; and should the
public exigencies make it necessary for the common preservation
to take any persons property, . . . full compensation shall be made
for the same. 142
States also began adding provisions protecting property to their
constitutions. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 declared “acquiring,
possessing and protecting property” to be part of the “natural, inherent and
unalienable [sic] rights” of all men and provided that “no part of a man’s
property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his
own consent, or that of his legal representatives.” 143 The Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 went a step further, providing for reasonable
compensation. 144
The movement to provide greater constitutional
protection of property rights thus gained considerable strength during the
revolutionary era.
138. Id. at 64.
139. See Treanor, supra note 102, at 790 (“[D]ivestment acts and bills of attainder effected the
confiscation of loyalist property worth, by one historian’s estimates, twenty million dollars . . . .”).
140. See id.
141. Id. at 791.
142. Northwest Ordinance, Art. 2, reprinted in THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 1787: A
BICENTENNIAL HANDBOOK 60 (Robert M. Taylor, Jr. ed., Indiana Historical Society, 1987).
143. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89, at 373, 639. A compensation provision
eventually was added in the 1790 Constitution. Id. at 373; see also CHRONOLOGY AND
DOCUMENTARY HANDBOOK OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 89 (Robert I. Vexler & William F.
Swindler eds., 1978) (describing a similar provision in Pennsylvania).
144. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89, at 373. For a discussion of the early
state Bill of Rights, see BOSSELMAN, CALLIES, & BANTA, supra note 97, at 94–97.
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Concerned about the “future security of property,” 145 Madison
ultimately stepped forward with an amendment to protect property rights.
In a speech to the first Congress in 1789, Madison proposed adoption of a
provision that stated, “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his
property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just
compensation.” 146 Congress responded with a different version that
eventually was ratified in 1791. 147 The records of the congressional debate
over the Bill of Rights do not reveal any reasons for the change in
wording. 148 Nor is there any written evidence of significant opposition to
either version. 149
In an essay written shortly after ratification of the Bill of Rights,
Madison presented his vision of property and its relationship to the
constitutional order. He maintained that government is “instituted to
protect property of every sort” and defined a “just government” as one
“which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.” 150
Consistent with this definition, he concluded that property is not secure
“where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of
its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their
occupations, which not only constitute their property in the general sense of
the word; but are the means of acquiring property strictly so called.” 151 Nor
did he believe that a “just security to property” was afforded by the
government when, according to Madison, “unequal taxes oppress one
species of property and reward another species: where arbitrary taxes
invade the domestic sanctuaries of the rich, and excessive taxes grind the
faces of the poor.” 152 Maintaining the “inviolability of property” required
that property could not be “taken directly even for public use” without
compensation; a government that “indirectly violates . . . property” was not,
in Madison’s view, “a pattern for the United States.”153

145. ELY, supra note 93, at 54.
146. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 448, 451–52 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 89, at 361.
147. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89, at 362 (“No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation.”).
148. See Treanor, supra note 102, at 791.
149. See Ely, supra note 121, at 18.
150. 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., Univ. Press of
Va., 1983) (quoting NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792).
151. Id. at 267 (quoting NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792).
152. Id. (quoting NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792).
153. Id. at 267–68 (quoting NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792).

812

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:787

Early physical takings cases dealt with real and personal property:
guns, horses, supplies, wagons, boats, land, and so on. 154 A review of the
Court’s precedent reveals the nuanced reasoning of those early cases that
was used for both real and personal property. Traditional physical takings
cases examined the character of the government action, the degree of
physicality, the impact of the government action on the use value of the
property, the degree of permanence of the invasion, the existence of a
conflicting public right, and the strength of the causal link between the
government action and the impact. 155 The focus was not just on the
existence of a physical invasion or seizure; the analysis was more complex
and nuanced. It was not until the 1900s—after the Court developed the
regulatory takings doctrine and announced an ad hoc factor or balancing
test—that the Court described the physical takings test in the unequivocal
and simplistic terms of a per se rule.156
IV. PROTECTING THE PROMISE AND REACH OF PROPERTY: SOME
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Differences should matter—not in deciding whether types of property
are worthy of protection, but rather in developing and applying principles
under the regulatory and physical takings concepts. On the surface, the
clarity of a simplistic, one-size-fits-all test is appealing. Applying such a
crude test, however, will lead to shoehorning, inconsistent results, and little
predictive value. 157 The Horne Court’s own language shows the fallacy of
its per se logic. The Court declares that a categorical duty to pay applies to
the seizure of an owner’s car just as much as to her home, and then applies
that approach to each individual raisin of a grower’s crop. It did not matter
that the reserve requirement was the price of entry into a regulated market
set up to protect the value of the grower’s crop as a whole. Yet later the
Court distinguishes a case involving a requirement that chemical companies
disclose trade secrets—which the Court concedes are property—in
exchange for a permit to sell hazardous chemicals, reasoning that the
companies received a special government benefit in the course of a

154. See Butler, supra note 9, at 1721–57 (discussing the traditional complexity of physical
takings cases).
155. Id. at 1722–23, 1740.
156. See id. at 1695–709 (discussing the development of the modern per se narrative).
157. Problems of inconsistency, for example, exist with other personal property cases, which
decided to apply the more nuanced ad hoc factor test of Penn Central, avoiding the more rigid per
se approach. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714–16 (1987) (applying the ad hoc test,
despite the “extraordinary” loss of the right to pass on property at death, to a requirement that title
to land located within Indian reservations escheat to the tribe when the landowner died—and still
finding a taking); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979) (refusing to apply a per se test to a
law prohibiting the sale of Eagle feathers and concluding that no taking existed under Penn
Central analysis despite the loss of the right to earn a profit from sale).
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voluntary exchange. 158 Under the per se approach, however, the strength of
the public interest and the benefits received by the property owner are not
part of the takings calculus. By its own logic, the Court thus demonstrates
how context dependent the takings calculus is.
Would, for example, the government’s seizure of a car used in the
commission of a crime constitute a per se physical taking? Would the
answer change if the owner were not involved in the crime or if the seizure
of the car was instead due to the driver’s failure to pay a traffic ticket?
Would the government’s destruction of a home be a physical taking if the
action was taken to help prevent the spread of a fire? When exactly can a
court consider the public interest or the benefits received by the property
owner in deciding whether a government seizure or appropriation is a
physical taking?
In Horne, the property context is not as clear as the Court suggests.
Had the government seized all or part of a tract of agricultural land to
protect the price of the crop by taking some land out of production, a
physical taking clearly would exist. Actual seizure of the land would
deprive the landowner of all rights in that land. But a more complex
question is presented by a requirement to set aside a portion of a fungible
crop in years when the supply from all growers is too bountiful to maintain
the price at an economically viable level. Growers enter the regulated
market with their eyes wide open, knowing that the size of the crop cannot
be controlled ex ante and therefore that some sort of government
management of the supply side is needed to protect their enterprise. They
enter the regulated market knowing that the reserve requirement reflects
market conditions. They benefit from being in a protected market because
it adds value to their product by stabilizing price. They, in other words,
derive economic value from being in the regulated market precisely because
of the value stabilization function of the reserve requirement. The fruit of
their labors is not just derived from the growers, as the Court suggests, but
also from the government’s regulatory program. 159 At the very least, when
a property owner cannot control the supply of his fungible, perishable crop,
the Court should consider whether the crop owner received reciprocity of
advantage from being in a regulated market. In such a context, the Court
should ask whether the crop owner came out ahead—despite any loss from
the reserve raisins—because of the price received on the competitive market
for the free tonnage raisins.
158. Horne v. USDA, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2430–31 (2015) (discussing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)).
159. In discussing Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, 279 U.S. 392 (1929), the Court distinguished
a requirement that oyster packers pay 10% of marketable detached oyster shells, or their monetary
equivalent, to the state for the privilege of harvesting the oysters by noting that the oysters did not
belong to the packers in their natural environment while the raisins were “the fruit of the growers’
labor.” Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2431.
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Some forms of property rights and arrangements are better managed
under a governance strategy and thus analyzed under a more nuanced
takings test that allows consideration of the reasons for the management
regime. A governance strategy “involves a more complicated and detailed
set of rules and norms. Greater specificity of practices and monitoring” of
uses may be needed because of the nature of the resources being used or
produced and the range of interests in the resources. 160 The Horne case
identifies one such context—when property rights are protected and
supported by a regulatory infrastructure providing value stabilization. A
per se approach totally ignores the complexities of this context.

160. Butler, supra note 9, at 1693, 1764–68 (defining a governance management strategy and
discussing why and when it should be used in takings analysis).

